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This paper examines the relationship betweenMedicaid pharmacy ben-
efit restrictions and reports of prescription cost barriers by beneficia-
ries, and the relationship between prescription cost barriers and
hospitalizations. The analysis uses data for adultMedicaid beneficiaries
from the 2000–2001 and 2003 Community Tracking Survey household
surveys, combined with data on states’ Medicaid pharmacy benefit
restrictions and characteristics of local health-caremarkets. Estimation
results show that stateMedicaid restrictions are associatedwith a higher
incidence of reported drug cost barriers and that Medicaid recipients
who report prescription cost barriers experience a greater number of
hospitalizations.
Over 52 million low-income individuals receive Medicaid coverage.
State and federal spending on the program amount to over $250 billion
per year, making it the largest single health insurance program in the
U.S. (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2005). Offering
Medicaid prescription drug coverage is optional for states, but all states
currently provide this benefit to most Medicaid beneficiaries. Medicaid
provides over $30 billion per year in prescription benefits, with over
500 million prescriptions covered (Holahan and Cohen 2006).
Research has shown thatMedicaid provides similar access and use of serv-
ices at levels comparable to private coverage (Dubay and Kenney 2001;
Long, Coughlin, and King 2005). However, the same may not be true
regarding access to prescription drugs. After controlling for health status
and other characteristics, several studies have found that Medicaid benefi-
ciaries are significantly more likely than the privately insured to report
not being able to afford needed prescriptions (Berk and Schur 1998; Coughlin
et al. 2005; Cunningham 2005).
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This paper examines the consequences of states’ Medicaid pharmacy
benefit restrictions for beneficiary access to prescription drugs in recent
years. Analysis of state policy trends over time shows that states have sub-
stantially increased access restrictions in their Medicaid programs during
the past 15 years, and especially since 2000 (Crowley et al. 2005; Simon,
Tennyson and Hudman 2009; Tennyson and Hudman 2007). We examine
the extent to which this changing structure of Medicaid pharmacy benefits
may contribute to drug cost barriers for Medicaid recipients.
Understanding whether and to what extent current state policies contrib-
ute to cost barriers among Medicaid recipients is particularly important
given the pharmacy benefit program changes resulting from the passage
of both Medicare Part D and the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. Medicare
Part D shifted the drug coverage of nearly six million poor elderly from
Medicaid to the new Medicare plans. While these beneficiaries are exempt
from the premium and deductible features of Medicare Part D, most will be
subject to tiered co-payments and other access restrictions adopted by some
state Medicaid plans in recent years. The Deficit Reduction Act grants
states new flexibility to increase cost sharing for prescription drugs for
many Medicaid beneficiaries, including children and pregnant women
who are now currently exempt from cost sharing. The Deficit Reduction
Act also allows states broader flexibility to deny care, including prescrip-
tion drugs, to a person who is unable to meet a cost-sharing requirement. As
a result of the Deficit Reduction Act, the level and scope of prescription
cost-sharing requirements under states’ Medicaid programs is likely to
increase in the coming years.
We also examine the relationship between prescription drug access prob-
lems and hospitalizations amongMedicaid beneficiaries. Prescription drugs
can be viewed as an alternative to other forms of care, and drug access
problems may have important negative implications for health and
health-care usage. Existing research shows that failure to fill needed pre-
scriptions may lead to greater use of other health services (Lichtenberg
1996; Piecoro et al. 2001; Sokol et al. 2005). Research has also found a sig-
nificant relationship between selected Medicaid prescription drug restric-
tions and increased hospitalization or long-term care risk among some of
the most vulnerable Medicaid populations (Soumerai et al. 1991, 1994).
Examining the relationship between unmet drug needs and hospitalizations
in the current environment and for the Medicaid population as a whole will
provide new insights into the importance of prescription access for this
population.
To explore these relationships, we analyze a two-part model of unmet
prescription needs among the Medicaid population. The analysis combines
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individual-level data from the 2000–2001 and 2003 Community Tracking
Study household surveys (CTS-HS) with data on states’ Medicaid phar-
macy benefit restrictions and characteristics of local health-care markets.
We use these data to examine the relationship between states’ Medicaid
pharmacy benefit restrictions and cost barriers to needed prescriptions among
Medicaid beneficiaries and the relationship between unmet prescription
needs and hospital stays among this population.
Our empirical models incorporate individual characteristics and charac-
teristics of the local health-care market that may be correlated with our out-
come variables.We also include state fixed effects to account for permanent
but unobserved differences in prescription drug cost barriers across states,
and year fixed effects to allow for differences across years that affect all
states equally. After controlling for these influences, our estimates show
that states’ policies that directly limit Medicaid drug coverage or raise
the out-of-pocket costs of prescription drugs are associated with signifi-
cantly greater reports of drug cost barriers among Medicaid recipients.
We also find that Medicaid beneficiaries who report prescription drug cost
barriers experience a higher rate of hospitalizations after controlling for
other factors. These findings provide additional insights into the relation-
ship between states’ prescription drug restrictions and health outcomes of
Medicaid beneficiaries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section dis-
cusses the existing literature on the effects of state Medicaid policies and
outlines the contribution of this paper. The following section describes
the data used in the empirical analysis, including states’ Medicaid pharmacy
benefit policies during our sample period. The fourth section of the paper
discusses our empirical methods, and the subsequent two sections present
the estimation results for prescription cost barriers and hospitalizations,
respectively. The final section of the paper provides a brief conclusion.
CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY
Although a variety of studies have examined the impact of state Medi-
caid pharmacy benefit restrictions on drug usage or health-care utilization,
most of this research examines the effect of introducing a single restriction
into one state’s Medicaid program, and many studies use data from earlier
time periods such as the 1980s. Several studies demonstrate that drug usage
byMedicaid beneficiaries is lower in states that impose co-payments (Nelson
et al. 1984; Roemer et al. 1975; Stuart and Zacker 1999). Other studies find
that limits on the number of prescriptions reimbursed are associated with
decreased drug usage and with increased admissions to hospitals or nursing
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homes for certain high-risk populations (Martin and McMillan 1996;
Soumerai et al. 1991, 1994). Similar results are found in studies of the poor
and elderly in Canada (Tamblyn et al. 2001). Dranove (1989) andMoore and
Newman (1993) find that Medicaid coverage of newer drugs decreased
follow-up visits to doctors and hospitalizations, but increased overall costs.
More recent work finds mixed evidence on the effects of Medicaid Preferred
Drug Lists (PDLs) (Lichtenberg 2005; Virabhak and Shinogle 2005;Wilson,
Axelsen, and Tang 2005).
In the current policy environment states are implementing many benefit
restrictions and adding new measures to the set of existing policies. There
has been comparatively little research into the combined effect of these
pharmacy benefit restrictions on prescription drug access or use. Simon,
Tennyson, and Hudman (2009) analyze the combined effect of states’ pre-
scription drug access restrictions on the growth in Medicaid prescription
drug expenditures. They find that these restrictions have helped contain
Medicaid prescription drug cost growth and that preferred drug lists and
tiered co-payment systems may have been more effective than other pol-
icies in this regard. Cunningham (2005) examines the relationship between
state Medicaid restrictions and beneficiaries’ self-reported cost barriers to
obtaining needed drugs. The study finds that adult Medicaid recipients in
states with four or more restrictions are significantly more likely to report
prescription drug cost barriers than Medicaid recipients in other states,
but the effects of individual policies are largely insignificant or have
unexpected signs.1
Our analysis differs by focusing on the specific policies that are most
likely to generate cost barriers for needed prescription drugs. Cost barriers
occur by raising out-of-pocket costs for drugs. This recognition leads us to
place particular emphasis on cost sharing, coverage exclusions, and limits
on prescribing, since these policies have the potential to most directly
affect prescription drug affordability. We also examine the relationship
between prescription drug cost barriers and hospitalizations among
Medicaid beneficiaries. Because existing research has shown that adher-
ence to drug therapy is associated with reduced hospitalization risk (Sokol
et al. 2005; Piecoro et al. 2001; Lichtenberg 1996), we hypothesize that
benefit restrictions may indirectly affect hospitalizations by increasing
prescription drug cost barriers. Specifically, we test for a relationship
between Medicaid pharmacy benefit restrictions and greater drug cost
1. States’ use of prior authorization and mandatory generic substitution were the only policies found
to significantly increase cost barriers in Cunningham’s study.
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barriers, and between drug cost barriers and greater use of hospital
inpatient services:
H1: State cost-sharing, coverage exclusions and limits on prescribing are associated
with an increased likelihood that Medicaid beneficiaries are unable to obtain prescrip-
tion drugs due to cost (Cost Barriers).
H2: Prescription drug cost barriers are associated with larger numbers of hospital stays
by Medicaid beneficiaries (Hospitalizations).
DATA
Medicaid Beneficiaries
The primary data source for our study is the household surveys of the
2000–2001 and 2003 CTS-HS. The CTS-HS is a repeated cross-sectional
survey of the civilian noninstitutionalized population, conducted on a two-
year cycle by the Center for Studying Health System Change. The respon-
dent sample is nationally representative, and the survey is conducted in
sixty randomly selected communities from the contiguous forty-eight states
and the District of Columbia. Alaska and Hawaii are excluded. Designed to
study the changing health-care system and the effects of these changes on
the community, the survey collects detailed information on respondent
health status, health insurance, use of health services, and satisfaction with
health care.2 The CTS-HS also collects information on a number of impor-
tant demographic, health, and financial characteristics. The public use files
report geographic locator information for each respondent, including state
and survey site of residence. These variables allow us to link state policy
data and survey site characteristics to each respondent.
Our sample consists of the adult respondents who receive health insur-
ance benefits throughMedicaid. We omit children from the sample because
they are exempt from many of the state Medicaid restrictions that we study.
We omit individuals who receive both Medicaid and Medicare in order
to reduce sample heterogeneity that may arise due to different reasons
for Medicaid eligibility.3 Respondents in Arizona and Tennessee are ex-
cluded from our study because those states provide Medicaid coverage
under Section 1115 waiver programs and many of our policy measures
2. An overview of CTS survey and samplingmethods can be found in Strouse et al. 2005 and Strouse
et al. 2003.
3. Estimates that include the dual-eligible respondents (the elderly poor and certain disabled indi-
viduals) are similar.
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do not apply. We also exclude respondents for whom state of residence
cannot be reliably assigned.4
The resulting estimation sample contains 2,038 adult respondents resid-
ing in twenty-four states.5 The respondents in the sample are mainly single
individuals, 37.4 percent without children and 34.2 percent with children.
Another 19.2 percent of respondents are married with children, and 6.2
percent are married without children. The remaining 4.1 percent of
respondents live in a non-nuclear family. The vast majority of respondents
are between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four years, but we retain in the
sample thirty-four respondents aged sixty-five years and older who are
coded in the survey as receiving Medicaid but not Medicare. These
respondents are otherwise very similar to the remainder of the sample
(in values of both the dependent and independent variables) and our find-
ings are not influenced by their inclusion in the sample.
Our key variables of interest are Cost Barriers andHospitalizations. Our
measure of Cost Barriers is obtained from the CTS-HS question ‘‘During
the past 12 months, was there any time you needed prescription medica-
tions but didn’t get them because you couldn’t afford it?’’ ‘‘Yes’’ responses
are coded as one and ‘‘no’’ responses are coded as zero, defining a dichot-
omous variable. Our measure of Hospitalizations is the total number of
hospital stays excluding those involving childbirth, which ranges from zero
to five.6 These data are obtained from a constructed variable in the CTS,
based upon responses to the question ‘‘How many different times did you
stay in any hospital overnight or longer during the past 12 months?’’, with
a follow-up question to women of childbearing age regarding the number of
hospital stays for the birth of a child.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for these variables along with those
for relevant personal, financial, and demographic characteristics of our
respondent sample. The data show that 22.13 percent of respondents expe-
rience cost barriers for needed prescription drugs during the survey period.
The mean number of hospitalizations is 0.26, with the majority of respond-
ents having no hospital stays during the survey period. As expected, given
4. A description of state of residence recoding for some respondents can be found in section 5.1.3.4
Data switching in CTS Household Survey User’s Guide, 2003.
5. Our initial sample includes 4,754 respondents who report that Medicaid is their only health insur-
ance. We drop 2,165 respondents younger than age 18; 172 observations from Arizona and Tennessee;
209 observations for which we cannot determine the state of residence; and 170 observations that have
missing data for the dependent variables in our regressions.
6. There is no available measure of number of days in hospital that excludes the number of days for
childbirth. Estimates using this measure and including a control variable equal to number of births yield
results that are similar to those reported here.
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for Regression Variables
Variable Mean SD
% Rx cost barriers 22.13
No. of hospital stays 0.26 0.74
% Put off any needed medical care 28.05
% Changed usual source of care 13.00
No. of visits to doctor 5.57 5.87
General health condition
% Excellent 12.17
% Very good 21.79
% Good 29.83
% Fair 25.27
% Poor 10.94
% Any mental health visits 20.31
Age 35.94 13.34
% Female 74.93
Race
% White 41.66
% Black 31.06
% Asian and other 6.48
% Hispanic 20.80
Usual source of care
% None 11.63
% Physician’s office or HMO 43.57
% Clinic 38.52
% Emergency room 6.28
% Medicaid HMO 33.17
Poverty level
% Poverty level below 100% 51.72
% Poverty level 100–199% 27.58
% Poverty level 200%1 20.71
Residential setting
% Large metro 92.25
% Small metro 0.95
% Nonmetro 6.80
Survey year
% Year 2001 47.88
% Year 2003 52.12
State Medicaid policies
% Co-payment 71.15
% Tiered co-payment 22.13
% Rx limits per month 26.64
% Limits on days per Rx 69.58
No. drug categories not covered 1.13 0.87
No. cost-sharing policies 0.93 0.71
No. prescription limit policies 0.82 0.77
No. other policies 2.34 0.70
Local health-care markets
No. pharmacies per square mile 0.83 1.93
No. physicians per capita*10 0.03 0.01
No. hospitals per square mile 0.01 0.03
Number of observations 2038
Note: Authors’ calculations from CTS-HS, 2000–2001 and 2003; from Area Resource File, 2004; and
from compilations of data from National Pharmaceutical Council (2001, 2003).
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the nature of the sample, respondents are relatively young, female, minor-
ity, and poor. The median respondent reports only ‘‘good’’ health, with 11
percent in ‘‘poor’’ health; just over 20 percent of respondents report at least
one visit to a mental health practitioner during the year. Around 90 percent
of respondents have a usual source of health care and one-third are enrolled
in a Medicaid Health Maintenance Organization (HMO).
State Medicaid Policies
We combine the CTS-HS data with state Medicaid policy information.
We obtain these data from Pharmaceutical Benefits under State Medical
Assistance Programs, a report published annually by the National Pharma-
ceutical Council (NPC) and based on NPC surveys of state Medicaid
program offices (NPC 2001, 2003), and from information reported by the
National Council of State Legislatures.7 We compile data on each state’s
Medicaid pharmacy benefit restrictions for the years 2001 and 2003. We
include in our database policies that attempt to reduce prescription drug
expenditures by directly affecting beneficiary access to drugs (Crowley
et al. 2003). Our analysis focuses primarily on cost sharing, prescribing lim-
its, and coverage exclusions since these restrictions have the potential to
directly affect out-of-pocket drug costs to beneficiaries. Because other state
utilization management policies may indirectly affect drug costs, we collect
data on these for use as control variables in our analysis.
Table 2 reports statistics on the scope and prevalence of the policies in
each state for 2001 and 2003. The table reports the number of states using
each policy, the mean value of the policy across states (for policies that have
varying values), and the mean number of policies in place in each state, for
each year. Overall the data show that states’ use of policies varies greatly
and that there is considerable change in policies between 2001 and 2003. In
total thirty-three states change the number of pharmacy benefit restriction
policies between 2001 and 2003. This cross-state and over-time varia-
tion will be used to identify the relationship between state policies and
beneficiaries’ prescription drug access.
More specifically, co-payment policies are an area of substantial change
during the study period. Five states add a co-payment and eight states add
a tiered co-payment policy (initiating a new co-payment or restructuring an
7. See Simon, Tennyson and Hudman (2009) for more details on the compilation of state policy data
from these sources, and Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (2005) for more on the
characteristics of state policy restrictions.
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existing co-payment) between 2001 and 2003. Among the thirty-three
states with a co-payment in 2001, fourteen of those change the maximum
co-payment amount. The average value of the maximum co-payment is
$1.86 in 2001 and $2.50 in 2003.
Medicaid law requires that states provide coverage for all Food and
Drug Administration–approved medications for which pharmaceutical
manufacturers have rebate agreements in effect with the federal govern-
ment. There are, however, nine categories of exceptions for which states
have the right to deny or limit coverage. Nearly all states provide coverage
for most of these drug categories, but a majority of states exclude cov-
erage of at least one of the categories. The number of states excluding
at least one drug category is thirty-five in 2001 and thirty-four in
2003. Among the states that have restrictions in place in both 2001
and 2003, two states increase the stringency of restrictions, adding an
average of 1.5 new drug categories to the list of excluded drugs; five states
decrease existing restrictions, removing an average of 1.2 drug categories
from the list of exclusions.
States may also restrict prescription coverage for each beneficiary,
including limiting the number of prescriptions per month, the number
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics of State Medicaid Prescription Drug Policies for 2001 and 2003
Policy Variables Year
All States
States with
the Policy
States with
the Policy
States without
the Policy Mean SD Min. Max.
Co-payment 2001 33 16 $1.86 $0.84 $0.50 $3.00
2003 38 11 $2.50 $.09 $1.00 $5.00
Tiered co-payment 2001 6 43 $2.33 $0.82 $1.00 $3.00
2003 14 35 $2.93 $0.73 $2.00 $5.00
Limit on Rx per month 2001 11 38 5.21 2.61 3 10
2003 14 35 4.72 1.52 3 10
Limit on quantity
per Rx (days)
2001 42 7 41.78 23.87 30 100
2003 43 6 39.07 19.00 30 100
Drug categories
not covered
2001 35 12 1.60 0.74 1.00 3.00
2003 34 14 1.56 0.70 1.00 3.00
No. of cost
and limit policies
2001 2.59 0.98 1.00 3.00
2003 2.92 1.04 1.00 3.00
No. of other policies 2001 1.88 0.73 0.00 3.00
2003 2.51 0.77 1.00 4.00
No. of total policies 2001 4.47 1.28 2.00 8.00
2003 5.43 1.43 2.00 8.00
Note: Authors’ calculations from National Pharmaceutical Council and National Council on State
Legislators data. Arizona and Tennessee are omitted from the sample.
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of refills allowed or the quantity of pills in each prescription.8 In 2001,
eleven states restrict the number of prescriptions per month; between
2001 and 2003 four states add new limits on the number of prescriptions,
and one state eliminates prescription limits, leaving fourteen states with
prescription limits in 2003. In 2001, forty-two states restrict the number
of pills per prescription, and this number rises to forty-three states by
2003. None of the states with prescription limits already in place in
2001 change the limit amounts over this time period.
In addition to cost sharing, drug exclusions and prescribing limits, many
states employ utilization management policies to shift drug use toward spe-
cific drugs or types of drugs (generally less expensive ones). Utilization
management policies include mandatory substitution of generic drugs
for brand name drugs; prior authorization requirements; fail-first protocols
that allow use of newer therapies only after older therapies have been
shown to fail; and preferred drug lists that make certain drugs available
without prior authorization. Utilization management policies are not the
main focus of our analysis because they have the effect of shifting use
between drugs or drug categories, and are likely to have no effect on
(or will reduce) out-of-pocket drug costs to beneficiaries. However, for
completeness, we compile data on the prevalence of these four policies.
Our data show that states use an average of 1.88 of these policies in
2001 and an average of 2.51 in 2003.
Other Data
We add to the data set selected variables from the Area Resource File
2004 release, to incorporate relevant characteristics of the health-care mar-
ket for each CTS survey site. The Area Resource File is collected annually
by the Bureau of Health Professions in the Department of Health and
Human Services and reports county level information regarding the health
professions, health facilities, and populations, among other variables. We
construct variables at the CTS site level by summing Area Resource File
data over the counties within each site. Summary statistics of the Area
Resource File variables for our sample of Medicaid beneficiaries are
included in Table 1.
8. We do not consider refill limits because most states’ refill limits apply only over a time period,
such as five refills per six-month period, and thus should not raise costs for beneficiaries. In addition,
National Pharmaceutical Council data are less clear regarding refill limits leading to concerns about
comparability of reported limits across states.
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EMPIRICAL METHODS
We test H1 and H2 defined above using econometric models that control
for individuals’ demographic, financial and health characteristics, and the
characteristics of local health-care markets. Based on prior research, which
suggests that lack of prescription drug adherence leads to increased hospi-
talizations, we estimate a two-part model of the effect of state Medicaid
prescription drug restrictions:
Cost Barriersist ¼ a01 a1State Restrictionsst1DXist1 cS1s
1 vT1t1 e1ist ð1Þ
Hospitalizationsist ¼ b01b1Cost Barriersist
1PWist1 cS2s1 mT2t1 e2ist ð2Þ
where the subscript i denotes the individual, s denotes the individual’s state
of residence and t denotes year. Cost Barriersist is a dichotomous variable
set equal to one if an individual reports reduced access to prescription drugs
due to cost, and set equal to zero otherwise. Hospitalizationsist is the num-
ber of hospital stays per year excluding stays for childbirth. State Restric-
tionsst is a measure of Medicaid pharmacy benefit policies in force in the
individual’s state of residence s in time t. Xist and Wist are vectors of other
explanatory (control) variables. S is a vector of state indicators and T is a vec-
tor of year indicators, and eist is a random error term.
For ease of interpretation, we present linear probability models of pre-
scription cost barriers; results using probit methods are similar. For the hos-
pitalizations models, we present estimation results using both ordinary least
squares (OLS) and negative binomial (NB) regression methods because NB
methods may be more appropriate when the dependent variable takes on
discrete integer values, and the interpretation of OLS and NB estimates
differs.9 Coefficients in the OLS models represent the estimated impact
of independent variables on the number of hospitalizations, while coeffi-
cients in the NB models represent the estimated percentage change in num-
ber of hospitalizations resulting from changes in the independent variables.
9. Because a large majority of individuals report either zero hospital stays for the year or one stay, we
also estimate probit models in which the dependent variable is set equal to one if the respondent reported
any (one or more) hospitalizations. Results show significant effects of prescription cost barriers on the
probability of one or more hospital stays.
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We also explore models that allow for prescription cost barriers and
hospital stays to be jointly determined. We approach this by estimating
equation (2) as above but treating Cost Barriersist as an endogenous
dummy variable. Using this method, based on Heckman (1978) and using
maximum likelihood methods as described in Maddala (1983), Cost
Barriersist is modeled as the outcome of the exogenous covariates in equa-
tion (1). The error terms e1ist and e2ist are assumed to have a bivariate nor-
mal distribution with mean zero, variance one and r respectively, and
covariance q.
STATE POLICIES AND PRESCRIPTION COST BARRIERS
Model Specification
The key explanatory variable of interest in equation (1) is Restrictionsst,
a measure of Medicaid cost and limit restrictions in the individual’s state of
residence s at time t. Our measures of state restrictions include the state’s
co-payment system (including tiering), limits on prescriptions (number of
prescriptions per month and number of pills per prescription), and the num-
ber of drug classes for which prescriptions are not covered. All models also
include as a control variable the number of utilization management policies
used by the state.
Our models include multiple policies and each state may have a number
of these in place, raising concerns about multicollinearity among the policy
measures. Thus, we estimate three alternative specifications that include
different ways of grouping and measuring the policy variables. The first
includes the counts of each distinct type of policy: the number of cost-sharing
policies (co-pay and tiered co-pay), the number of prescription limit pol-
icies (prescriptions per month and pills per prescription), the number of
drug categories excluded from coverage, and the number of utilization
management policies in each state and year. The second includes separate
indicator variables for each cost sharing and prescription limit policy, along
with the number of drug categories excluded and the number of utilization
management policies. The third includes measures of the stringency of cost
and limit policies—an indicator set equal to one if the state has a high maxi-
mum co-payment, and an indicator set equal to one if the state imposes
limits on both prescriptions per month and pills per prescription—along
with the number of drug categories excluded and the number of utilization
management policies. The high co-payment indicator is set equal to one
if the value of the maximum co-payment is in the top quartile of states.
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Examination of the estimated variance inflation factors (VIF) in each of
these model specifications shows variance inflation factors substantially
less than 10, indicating the absence of significant multicollinearity concerns
(Belsley, Kuh and Welsch 1980).
Other control variables included in the models account for demographic,
health, and financial characteristics of an individual that may be correlated
with drug cost barriers. These include race, gender, age, age squared,
income, and health status. Income and health status are particularly impor-
tant since those with fewer financial resources will be less able to afford
needed prescriptions and individuals in poorer health may report greater
cost barriers simply because they have a larger number of needed prescrip-
tions. Thus, we include family income in relation to the poverty level (at the
relevant family size), self-reported general health status, and an indicator
variable for any mental health visits.
The models also include individual-level variables to measure access to
routine health-care services. These include the nature of the individual’s
usual source of care, if any, and whether the individual is insured through
a Medicaid managed care organization. Coded choices for usual source of
care are doctor’s office/HMO, hospital outpatient clinic/other health center/
other place, and emergency room; the excluded category is no usual source
of care. The Medicaid managed care indicator captures any effects of man-
aged care on drug access (whether increased through case management or
decreased through utilization requirements).
In keepingwith economic theories of the demand for health care (Grossman
1972; Fuchs 1982), we recognize that use of health-care services reflects
individual choices regarding the allocation of limited resources toward
health care versus other goods. As a result, two individuals with identical
income, health and care access may demand different amounts of care and
may perceive different degrees of prescription affordability problems.
Although demographic characteristics may partially control for these dif-
ferences, we include indicators of the respondent’s continuing relationship
with care providers—whether the respondent delayed seeking medical
services for any health-care needs, and whether the respondent changed
his/her usual source of care—as additional controls. These variables mea-
sure gaps in the respondent’s health-care access, but because they are
choice-based they may also reflect the individual’s attitudes regarding
the relative importance of health care. For both of these reasons, we expect
that respondents who report putting off medical care or changing their
source of care will be more likely to report that they did not obtain needed
prescriptions due to cost. Additionally, in some models, we include the
number of visits to a doctor as a direct measure of health-care utilization.
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After controlling for health-care status, this variable reflects the demand for
health care, and also controls for the fact that reporting an inability to afford
needed prescriptions may be premised on first obtaining a prescription from
a health-care provider. For these reasons, we expect the number of doctor
visits to be positively associated with prescription cost barriers.
Additional site-level variables are included in the models to measure
access to pharmacy services since higher prices (including costs of time
or travel) for prescription drugs will also raise cost barriers. We include
the number of pharmacies per square mile in the individual’s resident
site to proxy for average drug prices (including travel costs), and metro-
politan area size indicators to control for other differences in health-care
environments that may be related to market size.
Estimation Results
Table 3 reports the results of estimation. All models include state and
year indicators. Reported standard errors are robust to both arbitrary forms
of heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation of errors across years within
each state. The first set of models reported include the state policy counts,
the second set of models include separate variables for each state policy,
and the third set include the measures of state cost sharing and prescription
limit stringency. To preserve space, coefficient estimates for the demo-
graphic, financial, and health variables are not reported in Table 3.10
All estimates demonstrate that states’ Medicaid prescription drug co-
payment policies are positively and significantly related to beneficiary
reports of prescription cost barriers. Whether measured as the number
of co-payment policies, co-payment and tiered co-payment policies sepa-
rately, or an indicator of a higher co-payment amount, co-payments are
positively related to prescription cost barriers. The number of drug catego-
ries not covered in a state is also positively related to drug cost barriers in all
model specifications. Prescription limit policies (whether number per
month or days per prescription) and the utilization management policies
are not significantly related to prescription cost barriers.
As hypothesized, respondents who report delays in seeking needed
medical care are more likely to report prescription cost barriers, as are
10. Coefficient estimates for these variables are consistent with expectations. Prescription cost
barriers increase with age and decrease with income. The relative incidence of prescription cost barriers
increases with decreases in reported health, and a mental health diagnosis has a large positive impact
on reported cost barriers. Those whose usual source of care is a clinic report lower prescription cost
barriers.
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respondents who changed their usual source of care. The number of doctor
visits is also associated with greater prescription cost barriers. The number
of pharmacies per square mile in an individual’s city of residence has a neg-
ative and significant impact on cost barriers, consistent with the interpre-
tation that greater access to pharmaceuticals leads to lower prescription
drug cost barriers.
The estimated impact of state Medicaid restrictions is nontrivial. A larger
number of cost-sharing restrictions is associated with a 17% higher likeli-
hood of prescription cost barriers, which translates to a 3.8 percentage point
increase—from the sample mean of 22.4%—in the fraction of respondents
reporting cost barriers—to 26.2%. Similarly, a larger number of drug
categories not covered is associated with a 7% greater likelihood of pre-
scription cost barriers, or a 1.6 percentage point increase in the fraction
of respondents reporting cost barriers (to 24.0%). States with a tiered
co-payment or a co-payment amount that falls among the highest quartile
of states have reported cost barriers that are 20% greater, which implies
a 4.4 percentage point increase in respondents reporting cost barriers (to
26.8%). Overall, the results imply that co-payments and drug exclusions
are associated with substantially higher prescription cost barriers among
adult Medicaid beneficiaries.
DRUG COST BARRIERS AND HOSPITALIZATIONS
Model Specification
The key explanatory variable of interest in the model of hospitaliza-
tions is Cost Barriersist, the self-reported measure of inability to obtain
needed drugs due to cost. We hypothesize that prescription cost barriers
will be positively related to the number of hospital stays. Control variables
in the model include individual-level variables to reflect the fact that hos-
pitalization risk will depend on underlying health, individual demograph-
ics, and access to nonacute health-care services. Poorer underlying health
will lead to greater risk of hospitalization holding all other characteristics
fixed. Demographic characteristics may play a role because of their influ-
ence on the ability to avoid, resist, or recover from illness or injuries.
Other individual characteristics such as race and income may also influ-
ence hospitalization risk if these affect overall health status, the use of
nonacute care services, or attitudes toward consumption of medical
services in general. The demographic, health, and financial characteristics
we use are the same variables included in the models of prescription cost
barriers.
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The models also include the individual-level and site-level measures of
access to routine health care. Greater access to regular health-care services,
including having a usual source of care, has been shown to reduce the risk
of hospitalization (Heisler et al. 2004; Klein et al. 2004). The individual
measures are those included in the cost barriers models—the usual source
of care and an indicator of insurance through Medicaid managed care.
Additional model specifications include the indicators of delayed medical
care and of a change in usual source of care, along with the number of visits
to a doctor. Site-level variables to measure access to hospital services are
the number of hospitals per square mile and the number of doctors per
capita. Metropolitan area size indicators are included in the models to con-
trol for other unobserved differences in health-care environments that may
be related to market size.
Estimation Results
Table 4 reports the OLS and NB estimates of the number of hospital
stays. All models include state and year fixed effects, and standard errors
that are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity; in the OLS models
errors are also robust to arbitrary correlation of errors across years within
each state. As in the previous table, the demographic, financial, and health
variables are not reported.11
In all specifications, prescription drug cost barriers are positive and sig-
nificantly related to the number of hospital stays, consistent with previous
research findings that reduced health-care access leads to greater hospital-
ization risk. The number of hospitals per square mile is also positive and
significant in all models, suggesting that availability of hospital services is
associated with more hospital stays. A greater number of doctor visits are
associated with a greater number of hospital stays, likely due to the effects
of poorer health. However, the measures of gaps in health-care access—
delays in seeking medical care and any change in the usual source of
care—are not significantly related to hospitalizations.
As noted previously, the interpretation of coefficients differs across OLS
and NB estimation methods. Coefficients in the OLS models represent the
estimated impact of prescription cost barriers on the number of hospitaliza-
tions, while coefficients in the NBmodels represent the estimated percentage
change in number of hospitalizations resulting from prescription cost
11. In all models, respondents with worse health status experience more hospital stays than those
reporting better health. In most models, respondents with a mental health diagnosis have more hospital
stays than others. Hispanics have fewer hospital stays than others.
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barriers. The estimated OLS parameter value of 0.125 suggests that prescrip-
tion cost barriers increase the mean number of hospitalizations from 0.26 to
0.385. The NB parameter value of 0.483 suggests that prescription cost bar-
riers increase the mean number of hospitalizations by 48.3% (from 0.26 to
0.386). Thus, the OLS and NB estimates imply similar effects.
Although theory and previous research suggest a directional effect lead-
ing from prescription cost barriers to more hospitalizations, it is possible
that causality could run in the opposite direction. That is, hospital stays
could result in a greater number of needed prescriptions, which in turn
could increase prescription affordability problems. Thus, we explore the
effects of treating Cost Barriersist and Hospitalizationsist as jointly deter-
mined. These estimates treat Cost Barriersist as an endogenous dummy vari-
able in the Hospitalizationsist equation using the variables that appear in
the Cost Barriersist equation but not in the Hospitalizationsist equation to
identify the system.
The estimation results are reported in Table 5. Note that the endogenous
dummy variable estimates use a linear specification for Hospitalizationsist
TABLE 4
OLS and NB Estimates of Hospital Stays
Variable
Number of Hospital Stays
OLS Models NB Models
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Prescription
cost barriers
0.125z
(3.789)
0.125z
(4.080)
0.104z
(3.436)
0.483z
(3.602)
0.459z
(3.356)
0.421z
(3.084)
Hospitals per
square mile
0.899z
(3.465)
0.871z
(3.222)
0.825z
(3.354)
5.209*
(1.893)
5.135*
(1.942)
5.232*
(1.938)
Physicians
per capita
15.768
(0.852)
17.885
(1.003)
21.046
(1.051)
113.198
(0.872)
119.664
(0.914)
123.109
(0.918)
Put off any
needed care
20.015
(20.542)
20.009
(20.344)
0.024
(0.171)
0.056
(0.410)
Changed usual
source of care
0.059
(0.850)
0.420
(0.597)
0.285
(1.658)
0.279
(1.571)
No. of doctor
visits
0.018z
(4.878)
0.068z
(6.825)
Observations 2038 2038 2038 2038 2036 2036
R2 0.096 0.097 0.114
Wald-v2
statistic
203.51z 2185.60z 2122.34z
Note: All models also include age, age squared, gender, race, family income relative to poverty level,
general health status, mental health indicator, usual source of car, Medicaid HMO indicator, metropol-
itan area size indicators, and state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary hetero-
skedasticity and in OLS models to arbitrary correlation within state. Values are given as coefficient
estimates (T-statistics) in OLS models and coefficient estimates (z-statistics) in NB models, *significant
at 10% confidence level; ysignificant at 5%; and zsignificant at 1%.
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and thus should be compared to the OLS estimates reported previously. The
results show substantial similarity to those in Table 4. Specifically, pre-
scription cost barriers remain positive and significantly related to hospital-
izations in all specifications, and the estimated coefficient magnitudes are
about the same as those in the OLS models. The statistical significance of
the estimated parameter on Cost Barriersist, is generally lower in these mod-
els, but remains significant at better than the 10% confidence level in all
specifications. One further note of interest is that the Wald test of indepen-
dence of the cost barriers and hospitalizations equations fails to reject the
hypothesis that the equations are independent (i.e., the hypothesis that q ¼ 0
cannot be rejected).
The estimation results linking prescription cost barriers to hospitaliza-
tions appear robust but are subject to a caveat that arises due to the struc-
ture of the dataset. The CTS-HS survey asks respondents at a point in
time about their health-care usage over the entire past year. Individuals
who are less healthy may need both more prescription drugs and more
acute care services during the year. Thus, it is possible that instead of
being causally related, prescription cost barriers and hospitalizations
are both driven by the same (unobservable) factors. Our empirical models
control for a wide variety of demographic, health, and personal character-
istics; health-care access and characteristics of local health-care markets;
along with Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), state, and year fixed
effects in order to reduce the likelihood of this problem. However,
because the CTS-HS does not follow individuals over time we cannot
completely rule out this possibility in our study.
TABLE 5
Endogenous Dummy Variable Estimates of Hospital Stays
Variable Number of Hospital Stays
Prescription cost barriers 0.124* (1.812) 0.121y (2.057) 0.106*(1.839)
Hospitals per square mile 0.898 (1.239) 0.869 (1.209) 0.827 (1.149)
Physicians per capita 15.790 (0.514) 17.876 (0.582) 21.054 (0.685)
Put off any needed care 20.014 (20.355) 20.010 (20.246)
Changed usual source of care 0.059 (1.080) 0.042 (0.759)
No. of doctor visits 0.018z (4.762)
Observations 2036 2036 2036
Wald-v2 statistic 147.97z 148.580z 162.080z
Estimated value of q 0.001 0.003 20.002
All models also include age, age squared, gender, race, family income relative to poverty level, general
health status, mental health indicator, usual source of care, Medicaid HMO indicator, metropolitan are
size indicators, and state and year fixed effects. Values are given as coefficient estimates (T-statistics) in
OLS models and coefficient estimates (z-statistics) in NB models, *significant at 10% confidence level
ysignificant at 5%; and zsignificant at 1%.
22 THE JOURNAL OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS
CONCLUSION
Our study uses a general population of Medicaid beneficiaries to exam-
ine the relationship betweenMedicaid pharmacy benefit restrictions and the
incidence of prescription drug cost barriers. We examine the impact of state
prescription drug policies that have the potential to directly increase out-of-
pocket drug costs for Medicaid beneficiaries. These include co-payments,
limits on prescribing and drug category exclusions. We also examine the
relationship between unmet prescription needs and hospitalizations among
the Medicaid population.
Our estimates show that co-payments and drug category exclusions are
associated with a statistically significant and economically important
increase in the prevalence of prescription cost barriers among adult
Medicaid beneficiaries. We also find that, for this population, experiencing
prescription cost barriers is associated with a greater number of hospital
stays. These results are consistent with previous studies that find the use
of prescription drugs by Medicaid beneficiaries is lower in states that
impose stricter benefit restrictions and that link this lower use to negative
health consequences or the use of more costly health-care services. In rede-
signingMedicaid policies under the rules allowed by Deficit Reduction Act
of 2005,statesshouldbeawareof thepotential forcertaintypesofrestrictions—
especiallyhigherco-payments—tocreatecostbarriers toneededprescription
drugs since this may lead to negative effects on health and health-care
utilization.
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